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I. Introduction 
In 2003, the Moroccan government introduced a state-sponsored religious 
reform, with the institutionalization of women into positions of religious authority as 
the defining characteristic. That year, female religious scholars (‘alimat) were appointed 
by the state to serve on religious councils at various local, regional and national levels. 
The position of religious scholar is a high honor for Muslims, reserved for the most 
prestigious and exemplary scholars. A few years later, as a part of this same reform, the 
state implemented a new program to train female religious guides (murshidat) to work 
in mosques and various other community centers. This program has been hailed as 
groundbreaking, and one of the first of its kind in the Muslim world, as the Moroccan 
state is sponsoring the training of women to enhance the participation of women in the 
religious sphere. 
 King Mohammed VI stated that the role of this reform, and the women in these 
positions, is “to achieve greater equality between men and women.”1 This concern 
expressed by the King is certainly warranted. According to the UNDP’s Gender 
Inequality Index, Morocco received a ranking of 0.460, ranking it 92 out of 149 
countries. This is the lowest ranking for the North African countries.2 While Tunisia’s 
constitution has affirmed the equality of genders since the country’s independence in 
1956, Morocco’s constitution did not include mention of equal rights of men and 
women until the 2011 amended constitution.3  
                                                        
1 Eddouada, 2010 
2 UNDP, 2014 
3 Consitution, Article 19 
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 Upon closer examination of the proportions of women participating in social, 
economic, and political sectors of Moroccan society, it is evident that Moroccan women 
are represented in quantities lower than their male counterparts. While this disparity 
varies across socioeconomic and urban-rural divides, women do not appear to have the 
same access to services and sources of empowerment as men. 
In 2014, male literacy rates reached 76%, while female literacy rates reached a 
mere 58%.4 While primary education enrollment is almost equivalent with 98% of all 
school-aged males and 97% of all school-aged females enrolling in school,5 rates of 
dropping out or failing to continue to secondary education are higher amongst female 
students than their male counterparts. In 2010, 84% of school-age males continued to 
secondary education, compared to 80% of females.6 This disparity is more concentrated 
in rural areas. According to a report produced by the Understanding Children’s Work 
(UCW) Project, a research initiative of the World Bank, UNICEF, and International 
Labor Organization, girls in rural areas of the country are one-third less likely to attend 
school than boys.7 In the small rural village of F’quih Ben Saleh in Southern Morocco, 
while the village has its own primary school, the closest secondary school is outside the 
village boundaries, meaning a longer commute for all students. Girls recounted having 
stones thrown at them or being chased on this commute, and others recounted their 
parents’ fear that they would be attacked or hurt during this commute as primary 
reasons why they either did not continue on to secondary school, or dropped out. 
Additionally, early marriage and the need to help support the family by going to work                                                         
4 World Economic Forum, 2014 
5 World Economic Forum, 2014 
6 Ahmed, 2011: 10 
7 OECD, 2014  
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are reasons for girls dropping out of school, or not completing their education, as these 
roles take priority for girls in traditionally patriarchal communities. 
A 2004 study conducted by the UCW found that girls aged 7-14 years of age 
were 26% more likely than boys of the same age to conduct unpaid domestic work 
within the home, but boys were only slightly more likely than girls to be employed in 
paid work outside of the home: 4% more likely.8 As of 2014, approximately 27% of 
women in Morocco are a part of the workforce, as compared to 79% of Moroccan men.9 
60% of these women work in the agricultural sector.10 Female participation in the 
workforce has decreased in recent years. In 1999, female participation in the workforce 
was 30%, but this percentage decreased to 25% by 2012.11 It should also be stated that 
employment does not necessarily constitute economic security or empowerment for 
Moroccan women. As is seen in rural areas, women work in the fields to support their 
families, often while the men of the family go without work and take the money that 
their female relatives earn. Rural women describe being stuck in these situations, with 
no alternatives.12  
Women are allotted the same rights to land ownership as men, but only own 7% 
of all land.13 Scholars cite tradition for women seeking to own land as reasons that 
account for this low percentage.14 Additionally, male relatives receive twice the 
inheritance that female relatives do, as stipulated by Islamic law.15 Disparities also exist 
                                                        
8 OECD, 2014  
9 World Economic Forum, 2014 
10 World Economic Forum, 2014 
11 Achy, 2013 
12 “Casablanca Calling” 
13 OECD, 2014  
14 OECD, 2014 
15 Alami, 2014 
 4 
 
in bank account ownership, as 27% of women compared to 53% of men have a bank 
account in his/her name.16 
In 2002, King Mohammed VI’s government implemented a gender quota of 
10% of parliamentary seats to be reserved for women.17 The gender quota became law 
in the constitutional reforms of 2011, which raised the proportion of gender quota seats 
in the House of Representatives to 15%.18 The number of seats in the House of 
Representatives was increased in order to accommodate this percentage, and to preserve 
the seats of the incumbent male politicians.19 According to the World Economic Forum, 
in 2014 women only held 17% of parliamentary seats, and 16% of ministerial positions. 
This ranks Morocco 98th globally for female political participation.20 In the current 
cabinet of Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, only one female minister holds a seat, 
compared to the seven female ministers of the 2007-2011 cabinet.21 
Moroccan family law, known as the moudawana, is based on Islamic law. It 
underwent a dramatic reform in 2004, making it the paramount case of ijtihad, as 
Islamic law was revisited to reflect an Islamic feminist interpretation of women’s rights 
as stipulated by Islam.22 This was possible through the culmination of years of efforts 
put forth by secular feminists and Islamic feminists.23 The reformed moudawana 
provides women with the right and ability to initiate divorce; extends Moroccan 
citizenship to children born out of wedlock; removes the requirement of male 
                                                        
16 OECD, 2014 
17 Darhour & Dahlerup, 2013: 136 
18 Darhour & Dahlerup, 2013: 137 
19 Darhour & Dahlerup, 2013: 137 
20 World Economic Forum, 2014 
21 El Haitami, 2013 
22 Edouada & Pepicelli, 2009: 1 
23 Edouada & Pepicelli, 2009: 1 
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guardianship for women in the marriage ceremony; extends of right of child custody to 
women, not only men, in cases of divorce; raises the minimum age of marriage from 15 
to 18 years of age; prohibits marriage without consent; and places further restrictions on 
polygamous marriages. 24 While these reforms were hailed as a major step forward for 
women’s rights, implementation within the judicial system differs widely among urban 
and rural communities. The government reported in 2010 that judges permitted 90% of 
marriages of minors that came before them.25 Men remain the legal guardian of all 
children, and women only may act as a legal guardian if the father is absent or 
otherwise debilitated.26 
As is evident from the examination of these subsections, Morocco has made 
improvements to the rights allotted to women. The issue of how to effectively 
implement and allow access to these rights, however, is an entirely different issue. This 
dichotomy raises the question of how to improve the status of women effectively within 
the context of Morocco, a question asked by activists, scholars and policy makers alike.  
This religious reform, however, is much more complicated than simply 
enhancing gender equality throughout the country. The state was, and continues to be, 
pressured by political and economic challenges to state security and sovereignty, 
reasons which the King has also mentioned in being a central factor for the 
implementation of this roles. Upon initiation of the program, the King noted the unique 
way in which these women could dispel “invalid beliefs,” and reduce “extremist 
tendencies.”27                                                          
24 Moudawana, 2004 
25 OECD, 2014 
26 OECD, 2014 
27 El Haitami, 2012: 231 
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Economically, Morocco faced, and still faces, massive widespread 
unemployment, especially for youth. Although the country has experienced economic 
growth under King Mohammed VI, this has not translated into job creation for young 
people. According to the OECD, unemployment amongst young people is more than 
twice that of adult unemployment. 28 From 2004 to 2008, although unemployment 
nationally dropped nearly 2.5%,29 youth unemployment increased 3%.30 In urban areas, 
unemployment for 15-24 year olds was as high as 32.2% in certain cities, with rates of 
unemployment five times as high for the educated population than the uneducated 
population.31 Underemployment is also prominent throughout the country, especially in 
rural areas, resulting in low wages insufficient to live on and high poverty rates. At the 
time of the 2003 reform, Morocco ranked the lowest out of all North African countries 
on the UN Development Report’s Human Development Index.32  
According to a survey conducted by the World Bank in 2012, 49% of Moroccan 
youth were neither in school nor the workforce.33 Breaking this down further by gender, 
for the entirety of North Africa, 22% of young men are not in any type of employment, 
education or training, compared to 40% of young women.34 This does not only include 
the unemployed, who are seeking work, but also the discouraged worker population, 
who has ceased looking for work due to various reasons. Within Morocco, after a year 
of entering the workforce, 60% of men remained unemployed, compared to 75% of 
                                                        
28 OECD, 2012: 2 
29 Trading Economics, 2015 
30 OECD, 2012: 2 
31 Rivlin, 2013: 87 
32 Rivlin, 2013: 88 
33 La Cava, 2012  
34 OECD, 2012: 4 
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women.35 Long periods of unsuccessfully searching for work, unsurprisingly, result in a 
growing discouraged worker population. 
Unemployment and discouragement amongst youth result in feelings of 
alienation from their communities and country.36 These feelings are much more 
pronounced in males than females, as is described by Gloria La Cava of the World 
Bank: 
Even though their unemployment rate is much higher, […] the young women all 
said that the greatest pressure for making an income is on the young men. This is 
because young men are expected to contribute money at home, and to save 
enough to start their own family. With the severe lack of opportunities they are 
capable of neither, and this failure has resulted in them becoming alienated 
within their own families. The psychological pressure that the young men face is 
huge. It’s not a coincidence that, for the poorer ones, the coping mechanism is to 
use drugs and to drift in inactivity. Young women are all keen to work, but 
unlike the young men, being unemployed does not affect their core dignity.  The 
theme of dignity is so important in the ‘Arab Spring,’ because it’s not just about 
income, but what employment means for you as a human being, in your 
community and your family.37 
 
These feelings of alienation and a lack of possibility are factors that have been 
linked to recruitment for extremist Islamist groups that can offer them a source of 
purpose and meaning that mainstream society was unable to provide. These economic 
issues are directly related to the rise of extremism within Moroccan borders, and thus, 
the political fear that the state also faced at the time of the religious reform. 
 In 2003 a group of young men from the impoverished slums of Casablanca 
carried out a series of suicide bombings throughout the city. They identified with 
Salafia Jihadia, a group rumored to have connections with al-Qaeda, and to be a part of 
the Wahhabi movement. Wahhabism has been characterized as an ultraconservative                                                         
35 Achy, 2013 
36 Rivlin, 2013: 87 
37 La Cava, 2012 
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movement stemming from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which seeks to strip 
modernity and Western culture from Islam. Wahhabists claim that a return to practices 
of the first three generations of Muslims is the only way to achieve purity. The 
Moroccan government issued statements noting the influence of satellite television 
channels from the Gulf as promoting extremist Wahhabi Islam amongst the perpetrators 
of these attacks.38 The kingdom feared its religious integrity and thus sovereignty was at 
risk, and just a few short months later, the state enacted this religious reform to reduce 
the spread of fundamentalist Islam.39 
The challenges facing the state, and the intentions of this program are much 
more complicated than women’s rights alone. Members of Islamist political parties 
claim inserting women into these positions are merely an attempt by the state to further 
extend the king’s authority and to discredit political opponents. Some scholars claim it 
does not go far enough in creating equality between the sexes because men in these 
positions retain some abilities that women in these positions do not. Media channels 
across the Western world praise the program for being a manifestation of the state’s 
commitment to improving the status of women in the country.  
 This thesis seeks to examine the role and influence of state-implemented ‘alimat 
(female religious scholars) and murshidat (female religious counselors) in the modern 
Moroccan state. Specifically, it seeks to answer the question: can installing women into 
positions of religious authority liberate women in Moroccan society? I conclude that 
women in these positions are providing women with more resources to construct 
positive concepts of femininity apart from oppressive traditional dictations of what this                                                         
38 Eddouada, 2010 
39 Eddouada, 2010 
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gender role encompass. This, however, will not completely liberate Moroccan women, 
because this reform strengthens the role of the state as the ultimate patriarchal figure for 
both men and women, and does not adequately provide men with more positive 
conceptions of masculinity. I argue that women in these positions are not adequately 
equipped to remove these sources of oppression, because they are intended to support 
the state’s ultimate power and reach in the religious sphere, while appealing to a 
feminist audience. 
As I did not conduct my own interviews or collect my own data in Morocco 
surrounding these women, this paper depends on the validity of the work of other 
scholars, surveyors, and reporters.
  
10 
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
My basis for formulating how to answer my research questions is to divide my 
analysis into two categories: decreasing oppression, and increasing empowerment and 
positive resources. I have based these modes of analysis on the sociological piece 
Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society by Fatimah 
Mernissi. Mernissi is a Moroccan sociologist, best known for pioneering the Islamic 
feminist movement through her scholarly reevaluation of the sunnah, and history of life 
in Medina. 
I chose this book as a basis because Mernissi intertwines Islamic feminist theory 
with her sociological studies of the current state of reality for women in Morocco. It is 
crucial to root Moroccan female liberation in Islamic feminism because this works from 
the context of Morocco’s values after independence, rather than the Western 
conceptualization of female liberation expressed by universalist feminism. At the time 
of Morocco’s independence, the state’s priorities in establishing its identity were: 1) 
Sexual equality 2) Arab nationalism and 3) Islam. In short, Islamic feminism adheres 
and develops from Moroccan society rather than imposes itself upon it. I provide a more 
detailed account of Islamic feminism and its aims later in this paper. 
The first part of Mernissi’s book discusses the concept of female sexuality 
within Muslim societies. She distinguishes between two main societal conceptions of 
female sexuality: “In societies in which seclusion and surveillance of women prevail, 
the implicit concept of female sexuality is active; in societies in which there are no such 
methods of surveillance and coercion of women’s behavior, the concept of female 
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sexuality is passive.”40 Muslim societies fall into the active female sexuality 
classification. Mernissi expands on this to compare the Judeo-Christian concept of 
sexuality, represented by Freud, with the Muslim concept of female sexuality, 
represented by Imam Ghazali. She notes that, “it is culture which determines the 
perception of biological differences and not the other way around.”41 Ghazali’s 
interpretations of female sexuality emphasize the concept of female qaid power, “‘the 
power to deceive and defeat men, not by force, but by cunning and intrigue,’”42 which 
social order is designed to reduce and dispel. Ghazali emphasizes the sexual needs of 
women. It thus becomes the role of the husband to satisfy his wife “so as to secure her 
virtue” and thus reduce the possibility of fitna, chaos, by enticing other men to commit 
adultery.43 Thus, the Muslim perception of active female sexuality “directly links the 
security of the social order to that of the woman’s virtue.”44 Muslim social structure is 
thus dependent on the following assumptions: “the tightly controlled patriarchal family, 
[…] the fear of fitna, the need for sexual satisfaction, and the need for men to love 
Allah above all else.”45 In response, Mernissi claims, Muslim society developed a 
number of rules to regulate the interactions of men and women to preserve the family 
unit, and thus discourage fitna. 
The second part of Mernissi’s book discusses her sociological research in 
determining the modern case of gender dynamics in Morocco. Based on her research, 
Mernissi concludes that, “sexual segregation, one of the main pillars of Islam’s social                                                         
40 Mernissi, 1987: 30-1 
41 Mernissis, 1987: 34 
42 Mernissi, 1987: 33 
43 Mernissi, 1987: 39 
44 Mernissi, 1987: 39 
45 Mernissi, 1987: 82 
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control over sexuality, is breaking down.”46 This is facilitated by the desegregation of 
schools, employment, and the street, all of which are factors of modernization. Thus a 
disparity arises between reality and the idea of what life should look like, as dictated by 
tradition. This disparity is what is dangerous. As Mernissi states, “The wider the gap 
between reality and fantasy (or aspiration), the greater the suffering and the more 
serious the conflict and tension within us.”47 This is especially emphasized in the 
desegregation of the economy. Economic power assumes the same role as sex in the 
Muslim order, as “the system of honor binds the reputation of men and women to their 
genital apparatus” of men providing, and women consuming.48 
Mernissi argues that at the time of her writing, the economic situation conflicted 
greatly with ambiguities in the family law discussing the role of the husband and the 
role of wife. Additionally, she states, sexuality takes a very different form in the 
modern-day depressed economy than the traditional Muslim society. For fathers and 
husbands, their female family members are out of the house much more frequently to 
work and go to school, making the fear of fitna, and thus his own dishonor, a daily 
possibility.49 Young men grow up under the premise that they must be able to first 
fulfill their masculine role as an economic provider, the mark of a good husband, before 
they can satisfy their sexual desires with their wife. But as they are unable to provide 
economically, due to widespread unemployment, young men find themselves “violently 
discouraged and legally oppressed,” and without an appropriate outlet for their 
                                                        
46 Mernissi, 1987: 107 
47 Mernissi, 1987: 149 
48 Mernissi, 1987: 149 
49 Mernissi, 1987: 161 
 
 
13 
 
frustration,50 as they have been socialized “to expect full satisfaction of their sexual 
desires, and to perceive their masculine identity as closely linked to that satisfaction.51 
Mernissi concludes by stating that the biggest impediment to these traditional 
concepts of masculinity and femininity is the state as the ultimate patriarchal figure. The 
state reinforces traditional notions of masculinity and femininity with a family law that 
does not provide women with the same rights to citizenship as men. At the same time, 
the state creates an economic system that demands the participation of women, and does 
not provide employment for men. This systematizes the rift between social realities and 
moral ideals. 
I use Mernissi’s concepts as a basis for what factors impede on female liberation 
in Morocco. These factors are thus: traditional conceptions of both female and male 
gender roles that do not reflect the current state of society, and an oppressive economic 
system failing to provide Moroccans with a substantial means to survive and straining 
the family structure. I additionally utilize Mernissi’s finding that social desegregation 
has very much been a part of Moroccan life since the democratization of education. 
                                                        
50 Mernissi, 1987: 163 
51 Mernissi, 1987: 161 
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III. Overview of State Religious Authoritative Bodies 
Morocco’s religious and cultural identity is founded on four pillars: the Ash’ari 
doctrine, the Maliki path of Islamic law, Sufism, and the King’s position as the 
Commander of the Faithful. According to the Moroccan government, these four pillars 
are instrumental in providing Morocco with a sense of unity.52 
The most prominent kalam (“school” of theology) for Muslims globally is the 
Ash’ari doctrine. The Ash’ari doctrine dictates how Muslims theologically 
conceptualize their relationship to God, and the role of the divine in the material world. 
Developed by Abu al-Hassan al-Ash’ari in the tenth century, the essential 
characteristics that define Ash’ari doctrine are the following: the belief that human 
beings possess free will in determining their actions, and are thus responsible for their 
actions; the belief that all human plans are at the mercy of God’s will; the belief that 
good and evil do not simply exist, as God declares what is good and what is evil; the 
belief that God defines what God is, and humans do not have the capacity to fully 
define what He is; the belief that the Qur’an and God are not “created” but rather “not 
He and no other than He”53 to emphasize that God and the Qur’an cannot be imperfect, 
unlike human creations; the belief that reason reveals the existence of God, achieves 
revelation and refutes error;54 the belief that if a Muslim commits great sin, she/he will 
be punished after death but will ultimately enter paradise; the belief that faith is based in 
the “affirmation in the heart, confession by the tongue and action by the limbs.”55 The 
                                                        
52 Rausch, 2012: 67 
53 Shepard, 2009: 141 
54 Shepard, 2009: 141 
55 Shepard, 2009: 144 
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Ash’ari doctrine thus dictates how Muslims conceive of the divine, and their 
relationship to God. 
While a kalam discusses the theological doctrine of divinity within Islam, a 
madhab (path or “school” of jurisprudence) dictates the practice of Islamic law. In 
Morocco, the Maliki madhab is predominant. This is intended to guide Muslims through 
all aspects of human life that concern moral choices, by determining which actions or 
practices are permitted (halal) or forbidden (haram). A variety of different sources are 
utilized by each madhab to make this proclamation, and within the Maliki madhab, in 
addition to the Qur’an and the sunnah (the accounts of the Prophet’s life and actions by 
his companions), the legal rulings of the first caliphs, the ijma (consensus of the 
scholars), qiyas (analogy), and urf (local practices of the people of Medina) are all 
utilized in determining God’s will for human life. The Maliki madhab is notably 
characterized by it’s ability to be “adaptable to people’s changing realities”56 and thus 
adaptable to modernity. 
Sufism captures a different spiritual aspect of Islam. It in itself is not a different 
sect, but rather an additional spiritual path for Muslims to connect with God. The Sufi 
approach to Islam can be characterized by two major qualities: an allegorical and 
spiritual interpretation of the Qur’an,57 and asceticism, referring to the absence of 
material comforts.58 According to Sari al-Saqati, one of Sufism’s early theorizers, a 
follower of Sufism “is he whose light of divine knowledge does not extinguish the light 
of his piety; he does not utter esoteric doctrine which is contradicted by the exterior 
                                                        
56 El Haitami, 2012: 229 
57 Denny, 2011:213 
58 Denny, 2011: 217-9 
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sense of the Qur’an and Sunnah; and the miracles vouchsafed to him do not cause him 
to violate the holy ordinances of God.”59  Sufism has its own saints, shrines, 
pilgrimages, and spiritual leaders known as shaykhs. The emphasis on Sufism in 
Morocco is further enhanced by Ahmed Toufiq’s position as the Minister of Religious 
Affairs, as he is a practicing member of the al-Tariqa al-Qadiriya al-Boutshishiya Sufi 
order.60 
With the institutionalization of the king as the Commander of the Faithful, 
politics and religion intersect. As the Commander of the Faithful, the king serves as the 
ultimate religious and spiritual authority in the country for all Muslims. This sacredness 
is founded in his being a sharif (descendent of the Prophet Mohammed), the Islamic 
practice of bay’a in which followers swear allegiance to a leader, and the use of 
religious practices as a form of legitimacy.61 Politically, this is affirmed by the 1962 
Constitution.62 The Commander of the Faithful enjoys “unchallenged temporal powers 
and religious sanctity.”63 Any comments against the king or discussion of Islam outside 
of the state-mandated doctrine are thus considered blasphemy.64 According to a speech 
delivered by King Mohammed VI in 2004, this convergence of political and religious 
power was necessary “in order to avoid any conflict of interest that might arise from a 
politicization of religion.”65 
                                                        
59 Denny, 2011: 224 
60 Al Ashraf, 2010 
61 Bouasria, 2012: 41 
62 Bouasria, 2013: 37 
63 Bouasria, 2013: 37 
64 Bouasria, 2013: 37 
65 Bouasria, 2013: 38 
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State power and religious identity are intimately intertwined as “the structure of 
the state is based on religion as a source of legitimacy.”66 Bouasria explains the dual 
purpose of the Commander of the Faithful position as: “that of defining the strategic 
field of action exclusively owned by the king, and that of controlling interstices of 
politics and religion.”67 This relationship of the state and religion is crucial to Moroccan 
identity, as El Haitami contests:  
By prioritizing the spiritual aspect of Islam, Morocco seeks to define its 
religious identity. This spiritual side of Islam is further endorsed by the king’s 
status as the commander of the believers, which goes hand in hand with his 
political authority, serving as a means to protect the religious identity of 
Morocco and underscore the status of Islam as the official religion and thus 
guarantee its practice.68 
 
The Supreme Religious Council 
Prior to 2004, the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs supervised all 
regional ulama councils. In 2004, the King extended his power so that these regional 
councils came under his control and oversight. An ‘alim, singular form of ulama, is a 
leader in an Islamic society who attains this position as a “learned doctor of [Islamic] 
law”69 through social recognition of their exemplary study of Islam. There are ulama at 
various local, regional and national levels, making up councils of seven ulama with the 
main function being “to remain in touch with the pulse of Islamic society in order to 
guide it in its real concerns, and to maintain lines of communication and understanding 
between central political authorities and the people.”70 In addition to the 2004 change in 
                                                        
66 Bouasria, 2012: 40 
67 Bouasria, 2012: 40  
68 El Haitami, 2012: 230 
69 Martin, 1996: 11 
70 Martin, 1996, 209 
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supervision, the King increased the number of regional councils from 30 to 70. This was 
an attempt to implement the policy of taqrib al-idara min al-muwatin, meaning “to 
bring the country’s administrative apparatus closer to the citizen.”71 
In 2005, King Mohammed VI created the Supreme Religious Council in order to 
consolidate the power to create fatwas after a series of fatwas were passed by regional 
ulama which directly contradicted Morocco’s religious tolerance.72 The king appoints 
members of the ulama to serve on this council, which he himself heads. In his speech 
announcing its creation, King Mohammed VI stated:  
We have entrusted the Supreme Religious Council with the task of proposing 
fatwa rules to our majesty, as a Commander of the Faithful and President of this 
Council, concerning the religious novelties, to cut the road in front of the 
promoters of sedition.73 
 
 In 2008, the Moroccan state implemented the Mithaq al-Ulama, meaning “The 
Pact of Ulama.” This is a state funded and implemented program to intensively train all 
80,000 members of the ulama within the country in courses focused on a respect for 
human rights and the need to adapt religious discourse to modern life.74According to 
Bouasria, this program has the “goal of raising the education level of Morocco’s 
religious scholars so as to avoid a clash between tradition and modernity in the Islamic 
education curriculum in public schools […and] in the promotion of ‘spiritual security’ 
by fortifying Morocco’s Sunni Maliki Sufi doctrine.”75 
                                                        
71 Bouasria, 2012: 44 
72 Bouasria, 2012: 40 
73 Bouasria, 2012: 43 
74 Kingdom of Morocco 
75 Bouasria, 2012: 44 
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The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs 
The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs monitors and regulates how 
Islam is discussed and dispersed amongst Moroccan citizens. Through this ministry, the 
government monitors mosques, qur’anic schools, and university campuses to ensure the 
rhetoric and interpretations in discussions of Islam follow the government-approved 
doctrine of Maliki Islam.76 The ministry oversees what occurs within mosques, and 
stipulates rules related to how mosques operate. Additionally, the Ministry runs state 
television and radio stations which air religious ceremonies and sermons, and publishes 
literature about Moroccan Islam.77 
In 2004, the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs began to provide 
religious trainings for imams in Maliki Islam, and increased restrictions on Islamist 
political groups.78 Since this restructuring, the Ministry administers guidance to imams 
regarding Friday sermons,79 and some claim that this goes as far to write and disperse 
all Friday sermons to imams across the country.80 Law also stipulates that the 
government must approve the construction of new mosques.81 A report by the U.S. 
Department of State in 2005 on Religious Freedom in Morocco mentions the use of 
informants by the Ministry throughout university campuses and mosques to report 
Islamist activities.82 These practices are not mentioned in the 2014 Religious Freedom 
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report, but reports by Human Rights Watch include mention of government informants 
in cases against members of Justice and Spirituality, a national Islamist association.83 
The Ministry’s power over mosques and imams exemplifies its political agenda. 
As Daadaoui writes: “Mosques are an integral part of the state’s policy of 
bureaucratizing religion, serving as important channels through which the state 
disseminates its religious authority and consecrates the legitimacy of the monarchy. 
Thus, imams of mosques are all appointed by the state and part of its religious 
bureaucracy.”84 As such, the Ministry dictates public discourse of Islam. 
Religious Authority as Patriarchal State Power 
As is evident from the structures of religious authoritative bodies discussed 
above, the King has increased his presence and control of state religious bodies 
immensely in the past decade. He made himself the overseer of all ulama councils, a 
position maintained for the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs previously, 
increasing his own power and thus decreasing the power of the Ministry. While he did 
create the Supreme Religious Council to contribute to the conversation of religion, he 
also declared himself the head of the Supreme Religious Council, maintaining his 
ability to issue fatwas nationally and influence the conversation of the scholars he 
himself selects to serve on the council. Finally, as the Commander of the Faithful, he 
stresses his role in preserving social order through the intersection of politics and 
religion. These roles thus consolidate religious power into one patriarchal figure, who 
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oversees and maintains all aspects of how the religious identity of the country is 
constructed.  
The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs exists to promote, disperse, 
and contain all discussion of Islam. With the King as the ultimate patriarchal figure in 
declaring what interpretation of Islam is acceptable, this Ministry then ensures this 
interpretation alone is discussed amongst citizens. This combination of a patriarchal 
figure declaring what Islam entails, and this Ministry to ensure this discussion is 
followed, seeks to promote a pious, united citizenry under the King, and under God. 
This method of using state-sponsored religion is not unique to Morocco, as other 
nations, such as Iran, have also used this tactic of “the saturation of public space with 
piety, [as] a populist move undoubtedly meant to bind believers to the ruling party.”85 
Morocco’s patriarchal religious power thus conforms to how modern patriarchal states 
rely on ideologies, rather than economic welfare as previously done, to project the 
image of the state patriarch. 86  
Under the current global dominance of neo-liberalism, which removes the state 
from the role of provider of welfare and economic opportunity, ideological influence 
has replaced the role of economic provider as a source of power for the monarchy. 87 
During a time of growing youth unemployment, the state has resorted to religion to 
resolve the growing issue, as Kandiyoti explains: 
At the domestic level, the male provider role, one of the bedrocks of male 
privilege, is under significant strain. High male unemployment rates and 
increasingly precarious forms of employment coincide with a period when 
women’s aspirations and their public presence have never been higher. Notions                                                         
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of female subordination are no longer securely hegemonic.  Reliance on a new 
politics of masculinist restoration - a politics that requires systematic 
indoctrination (Islamic, nationalistic or mixtures of both), greater surveillance 
and higher levels of intrusion in citizens’ lives- becomes essential to the 
maintenance and reproduction of patriarchy.88 
 
The form and intensity of patriarchal power of the modern Moroccan state has 
come a long way from that which Mernissi critiqued in 1987. Hassan II and his reign 
known as the “Years of Lead” ended in 1999, when his son Mohammed VI came to 
power. Mohammed VI introduced his reign under the mantra “development and ijtihad” 
with a focus on modernizing the economy, enhancing social welfare and civil society, 
and democratizing politics.89 Significant projects for women’s rights and human rights 
were a distinct marker of the new state. The apparent successes of new recognitions of 
rights, however, are not necessarily a full picture, as Maddy-Weitzman and Zisenwine 
convey: “the progress by which boundaries of authority were renegotiated was 
profoundly uneven, and as time wore on, more a product of state desires for cooptation 
than of meaningful state-society dialogue.”90 The focus by the state to improve and 
acknowledge women’s movements, Amazigh (Berber) movements, among others, all 
had a common factor: “the monarchy would pursue a dual policy of recognition and 
containment, support and co-optation, with an eye to creating another counterweight to 
the Islamists.”91 Thus, these reforms were carefully controlled and instigated by the 
state, without a substantial institutional structural reform.  
Programs such as the instatement of female religious authority may appear 
progressive in bringing women’s rights into the spotlight, but preserve and even extend                                                         
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the role of the King as the ultimate figure of authority. Even though new projects exist 
to theoretically improve the female place in society, it is crucial to note who controls 
their situation and boundaries: are women becoming more in control of their own 
circumstances, or is a male patriarch still constructing the boundaries that dictate the 
female experience? With this question in mind, I now detail the implementation of 
female religious authority in the Moroccan state. 
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IV. Implementation of Women as Religious Guides and Religious Scholars 
In the past decade, the Moroccan state has permitted women into two major 
types of religious authority: ‘alimat and murshidat. These positions are the female 
counterparts of the male positions of ‘alim and murshid respectively. Women in both of 
these positions are recognized as state officials, with wages equal to their male 
counterparts.92  
‘Alimat: Female Religious Scholars 
In 2005, only 2 years after the 2003 Casablanca attacks, King Mohammed VI 
appointed 104 women to religious scholar positions. Of these, 68 were to local councils, 
35 were to regional councils, and one was to the Supreme Religious Council.93 As the 
King described, incorporating women into the religious sphere would help decrease 
“invalid beliefs and extremist tendencies.”94 Women scholars, he stated, would assist in 
combining Islamic revival with modernity in accordance with the four pillars of 
Moroccan Islam. With the bombings as a fresh instance of the dangers of “religious 
illiteracy,” 95 ‘alimat were seen as a valuable source for developing an understanding of 
people’s realities and concerns in order to better combat religious extremism. The state 
placed a heavy emphasis on how women are able to reach other women, and thus youth, 
as mothers transmit beliefs and perceptions on to their children. Increased female 
participation in the religious sphere would thus promote Morocco’s moderate Islam, and 
work against un-Moroccan political Islam.  
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Instating ‘alimat was seen as a way to increase the reach of Morocco’s Islam to 
a significant portion of the population previously not included in the religious domain, 
thus reducing “religious illiteracy,” while simultaneously portraying Morocco’s 
commitment to gender equality. Upon the introduction of this reform, King Mohammed 
VI stated: “We wish to see women who are experts in the religious studies participate in 
these Councils (of ulemas or theologians), because we hope to achieve greater equality 
for them as well as equality between men and women.”96 This projection of the state’s 
dedication to women’s rights was crucial in “guarding itself against the ascent of 
political Islam – both within the country and in the world at large – at the point when it 
involved itself in the international front against terrorism.”97 Thus, implementing 
women as ‘alimat meant solidifying the identity of Morocco as a moderate modern 
Islamic state, to unite the country under Moroccan Islam and portray to the rest of the 
world Morocco’s stance against political Islam in the “War on Terror.” 
Historically, female Islamic scholars are not a new phenomenon, especially 
within Morocco’s Sufi tradition of Islam.98 Two such examples are Zahra bint 
‘Abdallah bin Mas’ud al-Kush, and Amina bint Khajju both of whom lived in Morocco 
in the sixteenth century. These women were trained in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and 
each operated her own zawiya (Sufi center).99 Both women used their formal legal 
training to teach other women about Islamic and Sufi beliefs, and lead them in religious 
practices.100 In the eighteenth century, the female Sufi leader Hajja Khadija wrote about 
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Sufism, traced her lineage to the Prophet, and “initiated men into the order.”101 The 
Darqawiyya Sufi order officially had eight practicing muqadammat (Sufi religious 
leaders) in 1942, and other Sufi orders have systems for women to elect their own 
female group leader.102 In the Sous region of Southern Morocco, in the seventeenth 
century women trained alongside men in fiqh and served as educators and experts for 
their communities.103 
The education of religious scholars, both male and female, takes place within 
Islamic colleges. These intensive training programs provide comprehensive courses on 
a variety of subjects, in many ways reflecting an education from a modern university in 
the breadth and types of subjects studied. Religious studies and classical Arabic, 
however, are studied in much greater intensity.104 Ulama and ‘alimat are not restricted 
only to scholars of Islamic law, and scholars of any field of study may be selected as a 
member of the ulama by the King. 
Within Morocco, a number of prominent Islamic colleges exist to train ulama 
and ‘alimat, including Qarawiyyin in Fez, and Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya in Rabat. 
Founded by a Moroccan woman named Fatimah al-Fihri in the ninth century, 
Qarawiyyin is one of the world’s oldest universities, and one of the most prominent 
Islamic colleges in the Muslim world. In medieval times, the college was one of the 
most respected institutions for Islamic higher education.105 Upon independence in 1956, 
the college became a part of the state-sponsored education system, with the Islamic 
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education temporarily removed from the Qarawiyyin mosque, and women permitted to 
enroll.106 In 1988, King Hassan II reinstated Islamic education to the college’s mosque, 
in order “to recreate a compliant body of ulama that would acquire legitimacy by going 
through a traditional Islamic system complete with its medieval trappings of both 
curriculum and physical space [… as] a traditionally educated cadre of ulama, it felt, 
would be a more reliable source of legitimacy for the current dynasty.”107 The following 
year, Hassan II built the Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya to also project this aim. This 
conservative Islamization of the state by Hassan II did not last long, as the Moroccan 
state, and thus its Islamic colleges, moved away from this promotion of conservative 
Islam in the 1990s and re-endorsed the moderate Maliki madhab, rather than the 
conservative Salafi madhab.108 
Both male and female students undergo the same traditional madrasa education 
in Moroccan Islamic colleges. Utilizing the traditional model of the madrasa, 
Qarawiyyin and Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya courses are structured around the call to 
prayer. “Teaching circles” and small group discussions stress the interconnectedness of 
pupil-teacher relationships, and allow for a prominent focus on oral tradition and 
memorization.109 Sufism is a prominent aspect of the Islamic education here as well. 
Asmae Lamrabet, a Moroccan Islamic feminist and the Director of the palace-funded 
Center for Women’s Studies in Islam in Rabat, describes Dar al-Hadith al-Hassaniya’s 
education as “very official, traditional, classical and orthodox. There is no progressive 
                                                        
106 Lulat, 2005: 155 
107 Lulat, 2005: 156 
108 Fakir, 2009 
109 Hardaker & Sabki, 2007: 107 
 
 
28 
 
ideal in this kind of speech.”110 These institutions are much less popular than modern 
universities, but students are able to earn the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree from 
these Islamic colleges. The structure of the Islamic colleges and education did not 
change when women began to be assigned to positions of the ‘alimat. 
Female scholars on religious councils are tasked with coordinating programs for 
women. This may include oversight of counseling programs, planning social activities 
for the community, visiting hospitals, prisons, and orphanages, and mentoring 
murshidat in their counseling abilities.111 ‘Alimat also deliver lectures and sermons, 
much like their male counterparts, in instances such as the prestigious televised 
Hassania lecture series before the King.112 Their sermons are only for female crowds in 
separate women’s sections of mosques and, depending on the location, take place every 
Friday.113 
Murshidat: Female Religious Guides 
In 2006, the doors of Morocco’s state-run Islamic training programs for imams 
were opened to women for the first time since independence. 114 These women were the 
first class of murshidat (female religious guides), and while they could not give 
sermons, they shared a number of similarities with the traditional role of the imam. Like 
the ‘alimat, murshidat were instated to preserve Morocco’s religious identity and to 
discourage extremism. According to Ahmed Toufiq, Morocco’s Minister of Religious 
Affairs, murshidat are to combat “the intrusion of foreign agents who may attempt to                                                         
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violate Morocco’s tolerant values and traditions.”115 They are tasked with preserving 
Morocco’s religious identity by conveying to women how to translate aspects of Sufism 
and the Maliki madhab into their social interactions and religious practice.116 While the 
murshidat program was designed in part by Dr. Rajaa Naji el-Mekkaoui, an ‘alima 
serving on the Supreme Religious Council, 117 the program appears to be initiated by the 
monarchy as a continuation and extension of religious reform.  
The term murshid has two meanings in Arabic, depending on the context. In a 
general context, murshid literally means a guide or adviser, with connotations to he or 
she who “averts people from straying to ominous trails and shows them the righteous 
path, who awakens hearts to the Divine, who opens minds, feelings, eyes, and ears to 
certain truths, and thus who guides them to the horizons of the heart and spirit.”118 This 
murshid can take many forms, such as an imam, or anyone who instills knowledge of 
faith in to those who crosses his or her path. In a Sufi context, a murshid, also known as 
a shaykh or pir, is a spiritual leader who “is credited with great piety and an especially 
powerful sense of God’s presence.”119 A murshid’s intimate relationship with the divine 
and spiritual journey led by his or her own spiritual teacher “justify his role as guide in 
disciplines of ethical reflection, supererogatory prayers and fasting, and special 
extended litanies (dhikr) that call constantly to mind the names and qualities of God.”120 
While the state heavily emphasizes Sufism as a defining characteristic of 
Moroccan religious identity, it is unclear how much the Sufi definition of murshid                                                         
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influenced the design of Morocco’s murshid and murshidat program. In a statement 
before the UN Security Council regarding efforts to combat extremism, Ahmed Toufiq, 
Morocco’s Minister of Religious Affairs and a member of the Sufi order al-Tariqa al-
Qadiriya al-Boutshishiya,121 noted the Moroccan commitment to Sufism as one of the 
primary attributes of the country’s efforts to construct a positive, progressive 
conversation about Islam, and the role of the murshidat program, in promoting the 
“particularity”122 of Moroccan religion. He does not mention the influence of Sufism in 
the construction of this program in this address, nor in the other statements reviewed by 
the author regarding the implementation of the murshidat program. 
Women interested in becoming a murshida must complete a competitive 
application process, which is reviewed by members of the ulama. In this process, 
hundreds of applicants are narrowed down to form an annual class size of 150 murshid, 
and 50 murshidat. To be eligible for the program, applicants must be under forty years 
of age, hold a bachelor’s degree, and be ranked in the top percentile of their graduating 
class.123 Men must have the entire Qur’an memorized to be admitted, but women are 
required to only memorize half.124 
Those accepted into the training program attend classes in a wide variety of 
subjects including courses covering religious dogma, sociology of religion, psychology, 
the sciences, computer skills, economics, law, business management, Arabic language, 
Qur’anic chanting, Muslim history, geography, preaching, and women’s law.125 All 
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together, this amounts to thirty-two subjects covered over the course of forty-five 
weeks.126 The Supreme Religious Council coordinates and teaches the Islamic subjects, 
and professors from local universities teach the various non-Islamic subjects. Women 
and men are taught alongside each other in the classroom, with the only exception being 
an additional course for murshidat about women’s law. The ‘alimat who train the 
murshidat are only permitted to discuss Maliki Islam, and no other madhab, as this 
would jeopardize the unity created by following one madhab and thus releasing fitna. 
Additionally, “controversial issues” are not discussed during their training.127 
Those who graduate the program are assigned to mosques, schools, hospitals, 
youth centers, and prisons near to where they live. Murshidat are generally responsible 
for five to eight mosques in addition to a handful of other institutions, and murshid in 
contrast are assigned to predominantly mosques. This discrepancy is due to the higher 
demand for women’s instruction owing to how women with a lower socioeconomic 
status are less likely to attend or complete school, which is a primary venue for religious 
instruction.128 Murshidat may provide religious counseling on personal affairs, offer 
literacy classes, or lecture about Islam, but in all cases are meeting with women in their 
places of work, school, and even homes to establish relationships. 
Murshidat are intended to complement the role of ‘alimat in reaching multiple 
levels of society, both with the same intent of promoting the teachings of Moroccan 
Islam. Murshidat are stationed within mosques across the country, where they teach 
classes for women regarding literacy and Qur’anic recitation, and provide counseling 
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services about various aspects of religious and social life.129 In all of these settings, the 
main focus of these conversations tends to be related to be the role of the woman in her 
family and marriage.130 In addition to their work in mosques, murshidat also provide 
religious counseling in prisons, hospitals, schools and orphanages.131 Due to the 
different structures and tasks of each position, ‘alimat and murshidat have different 
strengths and abilities in achieving the goals of the reform: 
Although the women serving on the High Council of Ulema have a superior 
official ranking within the religious hierarchy, the murshidat enjoy wider 
visibility and greater proximity to the recipients of their services, upon whose 
recognition and acquiescence their authority ultimately rests. This proximity and 
visibility expands their potential for reshaping individual interpretations of Islam 
and local understandings of women’s right to exercise religious authority.132 
 
The responsibilities of their male counterparts (murshid) are almost identical, 
although they additionally lead prayers and sermons when the imam of one the mosque 
they are stationed in is unavailable. Murshidat are barred from leading prayers or giving 
sermons by a fatwa issued by the Supreme Religious Authority which forbids women 
from leading prayer.133 Women must pray in silence, it states. 
Although implemented as a part of the same program, national and international 
news surrounding the murshid and murshidat focus almost entirely on the female 
counselors. Nationally, the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs funds 
television news specials about their work. This news coverage is overwhelmingly 
positive. Internationally, murshidat are flown to Western countries to “publicize this 
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novel addition to the religious education system.”134 Remaining visible, both nationally 
and internationally, thus also becomes a requirement of murshidat. 
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V. Profiles of ‘Alimat and Murshidat 
To gain a better understanding of the role and impact of the ‘alimat and the 
murshidat in their respective communities, this section examines the work of two 
female religious scholars, Dr. Rajaa Naji el-Mekkaoui, and Dr. Fatimah Bouselama, and 
three female religious guides, Bouchra, Hannane and Karima. 
Dr. Rajaa Naji Mekkaoui 
Dr. Rajaa Naji Mekkaoui is an ‘alima on the Supreme Religious Council, and a 
professor of law at University Mohammed V in Rabat. Dr. Mekkaoui became the first 
Moroccan woman to receive a PhD in law from Mohammed V University in 1997, a 
state-run public university. She was also the first female head of the medical law 
department at Mohammed V University through her work surrounding organ donation 
and transplantation.135 
In 2003, Dr. Mekkaoui became the first woman ever to address the king during 
the Hassania lecture, an important religious lecture performed during the Holy Month of 
Ramadan. The King, high-ranking officials, and figures of religious authority from 
across the Muslim world attend these lectures, which is broadcast on state-run television 
channels throughout Morocco.136 This was not only the first time a woman spoke in the 
series, but also the first time a woman had entered the chambers where the lecture takes 
place.137 Since her involvement, female scholars from a number of disciplines, not only 
limited to the religious sphere, have delivered lectures as a part of this series.138 She had 
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the following comment about her lecture: “Many don’t understand why I take part in 
this ceremony. Out of habit we think that religious laws don’t allow women into the 
priesthood, but once a woman overcomes these obstacles, she will become more 
acceptable.”139 
Since her appointment to the Supreme Religious Council, Dr. Mekkaoui assisted 
in designing the structure of the murshidat program.140 She notes the participation of 
women in the Hassania lecture series as crucial in orchestrating a place for the 
murshidat program: “[setting up the murshidat program] became less difficult, because 
people had this image of a woman in a religious context.”141 She worked with the 
Minister of Religious Affairs, Ahmed Toufiq, and a respected Islamic scholar, Professor 
Abdelhadi Boutaleb, in the design of the program.142  
Dr. Mekkaoui speaks out about the need for reform of the conceptualization of 
the modern family unit. Mekkaoui acknowledges the necessity of combatting Western 
concepts of what constitutes a family, and the importance of formulating a definition of 
family to fit the Moroccan context. The family unit, she states, is in danger of 
“extinction.”143 She discusses the term qiwamah, which appears most famously in verse 
4:34 of the Qur’an. This verse is at the forefront of the debate of gender relations in 
Islam, and translates as: “men are qiwamanun to women.” While traditionalists interpret 
this term as meaning that men are dominant over women because they are preferred by 
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God,144 Mekkaoui states this interpretation is derived from the monopolization of 
control and oppression.145 Through her presentation of other verses in which the term 
qiwamah appears in the Qur’an, she concludes that the only possible and logical 
meaning for the term is financial responsibility. In exchange for providing financially 
for the family, the other family members are compliant with the provider, not 
subordinate as oppressive interpretations state. Additionally, this does not construct 
husband-wife dynamics, as children are an integral part of the family unit, and their 
relations to their parents are also thus discussed.146 She concludes with a number of 
suggestions to rejuvenate the Moroccan family unit, including: encouraging family 
members to discuss family issues, prioritizing proper knowledge of Islam and its 
teachings, and establishing an institution alongside the court to support families.147 
This interpretation gives women agency, as they are not restricted to 
subordination of their husbands, and rather are considered a valuable member of the 
family regardless of whether a part of the workforce, or a housewife. In her discussion, 
it is not the role that confirms one’s masculinity or femininity, but rather the love and 
support family members offer each other. Mekkaoui’s discussion of the modern family 
unit is thus not based in oppressive gender roles, and offers an alternative to this 
narrative. 
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Fatimah Bouselama 
Fatimah Bouselama has served as an ‘alima on a regional religious council in 
Casablanca since her appointment 2004. Her main tasks include training murshidat at 
the Dar al-Hadith Hassania, and providing religious guidance to those who seek it. She 
discusses how female scholars are more interested family law and have much more 
knowledge of women’s issues than the men on these councils. She additionally noted 
how these councils are relatively isolated from their communities, a trend she seeks to 
change.148 
Bouselama has published a number of pieces with palace-funded Center for 
Women’s Studies in Islam regarding the significance and status of women in Islam, 
especially in the Medina, to the modern day situation. She states that although progress 
has been made for the family unit through the reform of the family law, law alone is not 
enough to solve issues within the family: this will only be achieved by a return to 
Moroccan culture and religion to rejuvenate morality and family values. She thus 
examines the actions of the Prophet Mohammed in constructing a narrative of what 
family life should entail in delineation of roles within the home, specifically regarding 
housework. She acknowledges the modern applicability of this issue between the 
spouses, and the frustrations of wives (displayed by Fatimah) when their husbands do 
not assist with household chores. 149 She concludes that the actions of the Prophet, such 
as fetching water and tending to the livestock, confirm that household chores ought to 
be shared.150 For the husband who claims he is too busy to help his wife, she poses a 
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question for him: could it be that you are busier than the Prophet when he was building 
the first Islamic society and responsible for transmitting the teachings of Islam?151 If the 
husband is concerned for his pride and masculinity, she stresses the words of Ibn Hajjar 
in describing a man as being he who leaves arrogance behind for the benefit of his 
family. Cooperation of the spouses, she states, makes for happy and just marriages 
following in the example of Prophet. 
Bouselama’s interpretation of the Prophet’s actions counter oppressive gender 
expectations of the strict delineation of roles between husband and wife. By focusing on 
cooperation and justice in a family, Bouselama offers an alternative for both men and 
women in constructing their idea of what masculinity and femininity entail. Rather than 
relating gender roles to completing a specific type of task, she emphasizes promoting 
justice and cooperation across the family unit for a sustainable marriage free of 
injustice. 
The same concepts discussed by Mekkaoui have become a part of government 
rhetoric. According to the current family law, men must “provide for their family’s 
needs, while women can choose to contribute as their abilities allow.”152 Although the 
scholarly work developed by Bouselama was also published by a prestigious palace-
funded religious research institution, I could not find evidence that the state took any 
steps to institutionalize her work into the family law as of yet. 
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Bouchra 
 Bouchra153 is a murshida serving in the Northeast Larache region of the country. 
She is assigned to a rural mosque, and a dormitory for girls who attend secondary 
school from the countryside. Through this position, she meets with groups of women 
and girls to discuss issues in their lives and relationships. Common issues she discusses 
with women are restrictive fathers, abusive husbands, illiteracy, and poverty. 
 The girls at the dormitory are sent by their families from surrounding rural 
villages so that they can continue their education. Bouchra meets with the girls to lead 
them in prayer, give lectures about Islam and the importance of education, and to 
discuss issues that they face with their families. Restrictive, untrusting fathers are a 
large source of stress for the girls at the dormitory, an issue  that drove one teenage girl 
at the dormitory to commit suicide. In her interactions with girls who are upset about 
overbearing fathers, an issue many girls report, Bouchra states: “There is a 
misunderstanding in our society that girls are the cause of troubles and if a girl is away 
from home she will get herself into trouble. These are the fears your father has. We will 
change his thinking. As women, we can do anything and as a girl you can help change 
your dad. We’ll try lots of things and if one doesn’t work then we’ll try something 
else.” 
 In addition to her role at the boarding school, Bouchra meets with women out in 
the fields, where they perform farm work. One young woman recounts her situation: 
“Around here, most men don’t work. If you go to a house now you’ll find the men 
sleeping. Women are working in the fields all day. First you work to support your                                                         
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family, then you work to support your husband and children. And so it goes on until 
God offers you a way out. I don’t know how old I am. I never went to school. I always 
worked. […] Women are doomed and then they die. It is a hard life of labor.” For these 
women, who never went to school, Bouchra states: “When I compare the girls working 
in the fields to the girls in school, I feel a crime is being committed against the girls in 
the fields. Islam doesn’t forbid a girl to work, but that is not where a girl should be. A 
girl should be getting an education. […] Even though I believe in my work, sometimes I 
feel I can’t do enough. In some situations there is little I can do to help. Girls are forced 
to work here because of poverty. They don’t have choices in life and get mistreated by 
their husbands. It’s a combination of ignorance and poverty. We can’t get rid of poverty 
but we can try to change how people think.” 
 For both of these groups of women, Bouchra stresses the importance of 
communication, and the female right to make her own choices regarding marriage. She 
encourages girls and women to speak with those who are causing them anguish about 
how it is affecting them, with the goal, in her own words, of helping people better 
understand each other. Bouchra also stresses that girls have the right to choose when 
and whom they marry. She encourages girls to stand up for themselves when their 
families pressure them to quit school to get married, or to marry someone they do not 
know well.  
While Bouchra was able to meet with women in their homes, places of work, 
and schools, she had a limited scope outside of this circle. After a young girl at the 
dormitory committed suicide, although she considered calling a meeting for the parents 
of all of the girls in the dormitory, an overwhelming majority would not be able to 
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attend, nor could she reach them. In another instance, when a woman came to her 
distressed about her abusive son-in-law, Bouchra suggested a local women’s 
organization may be able to intervene, but she herself could not meet with him.  
Hannane 
Hannane154 is a murshida stationed in a mosque, secondary school, and prison in 
Rabat. Her roles take many shapes, including leading women in discussion groups, and 
teaching women to read and write, both of which are stationed at a mosque. Issues that 
arise in her discussions are those of harsh mothers-in-law, expressing love for children, 
the marriage of minors, and female illiteracy. 
 Through her women’s group at the mosque, Hannane leads discussions amongst 
women about what their role in society is, and how to strengthen and improve personal 
relationships. She emphasizes the great influence women have: “What is your role is 
society? Society needs you, it is not just ‘me, my husband and my children.’ […] we 
must rebuild the ideas taught by Islam together.” She recounts this during a 
confrontation with a shopkeeper who criticizes her for being a working mother: “Many 
people think that Islam forbids women to work but when you ask them for proof they 
can’t find it. The problem is the social traditions passed from one generation to another. 
[…] Islam gave women a really important role whether at home or in society.” 
 Early marriage is a prominent discussion for Hannane and those she advises. 
When a grandmother conveyed concern regarding her young granddaughter’s 
unhappiness, Hannane urged patience and compassion, rather than anger and 
physicality, in discussing this. She explained how dropping out of school early to work                                                         
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meant the girl had not been able to experience a lot of things, and that early marriage 
would only exacerbate this frustration. When meeting with a girl whose parents wanted 
her to drop out of school to marry a boy she has been promised to since she was four 
years old, Hannane stresses choice: “You have obeyed your parents in many things, but 
with marriage, God has given a woman the right to choose for herself. You must 
explain that you have the right to refuse this marriage. This is your right – Sharia law 
says so.” It is interesting to note that in both of these interactions, although the legal age 
of marriage is eighteen, she never uses this as a reason why the marriage of young girls 
should be discouraged. 
To combat the cycle of cruelty towards daughters in law, she asks women to 
“open our hearts to each other.” One of the group participants states: “what is needed is 
this, to get together and talk to each other. If we are here and others are not, we will 
never understand each other.” In a similar vein of encouraging communication and 
strengthening family relationships, Hannane encourages showing affection and being 
openly supportive towards children as crucial to fostering relationships: “You can build 
bridges with your children so you don’t lose them. Many mothers push their children 
away without meaning to. They care about them but they never show that love.”  
 Hannane also teaches women to read and write. For many, this is the first time 
they have been able to access such a class. She states: “Islam is a religion of learning. 
The Prophet told us that learning is a duty. The first word of the Qur’an is ‘read’ - its 
something every Muslim should do.” 
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Karima 
 Karima155 serves as a murshidat in Rabat, and is assigned to a school and 
mosque. Her husband, proud of Karima’s role, remarks, “I don’t think there are enough 
[murshidat] yet to support all the women who need them. And with the skills that 
women have, their skills should not just be used to help women but to help men as well, 
why not?” 
 Karima represented Morocco at an internal conference titled Women Breaking 
Boundaries, where she spoke about the importance of female representation in religion, 
and how Islam discusses gender. She stated: “Islam gave the opportunity for men and 
women to both participate and doesn’t make roles exclusive to one or another.”  
 She discusses the prominent role women played in the early developments of 
Islamic society, and actively translates this context to youth through field trips to 
historic sites such as the Qarawiyyin mosque in Fez. “Women were behind many 
developments in Islamic culture,” she states. These trips to cultural sites are crucial not 
only in discussing the role of women in society, but also in celebrating Moroccan and 
Islamic culture. In her discussions with a group of teenage boys, they recounted 
concepts that Western youth their age are more mentally developed than they, and 
aspirations to migrate to the West. Karima always counters this: “It is good to learn 
things from developed cultures but we have forgotten to look at our own roots and the 
reason we don’t communicate is because we don’t follow our religion.” She discusses 
the “empty space” that young people create when they migrate, causing rifts in their 
communities.                                                          
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 Karima reaches both young men and young women in her service, and appears 
to have more interactions with young men than Hannane or Bouchra. One of the male 
students she counsels conveys his respect and appreciation for her work: “The 
murshidat try to help people through religious teachings. Since they started coming to 
our school it made a difference. They’ve had training and they really understand the 
true Islam. They use religion to teach about modern life and it’s a really good way to 
deal with things because many of us don’t have people to show us the right path.” 
Karima has high hopes for the future. She states: “My hope is that women will 
reach really high positions in Moroccan society. If we reach those positions then we can 
make decisions that give rights to every woman and to every man and child. As a 
woman I just feel that women understand what women need and we are the ones who 
know what to do to make sure we get our rights.” She sees a foundation of 
understanding female participation in Islam as integral to making this possible in the 
future. 
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VI. Impact on Patriarchal Notions of Society 
This section is divided into two sections: the impact of ‘alimat and murshidat in 
reducing sources of oppression, and increasing sources of empowerment. 
Increasing Empowerment, Within Limits 
 Murshidat and ‘alimat are increasing sources of empowerment for women, but 
their efforts and scope are limited by the state. They are providing support, exposure, 
and new skills to Moroccan women, all of which are invaluable in enhancing female 
empowerment. While this type of visibility and participation are new to the religious 
sector, the content and initiation is conducted entirely by the King, rather than 
empowering women themselves to create their own reforms. 
Although the King dictates what Islam encompasses, creating space for female 
religious scholars in a previously male environment does declare that the religion also 
belongs to women. Drawing from the writings of Islamic feminists, it is not Islam that 
oppresses women in the Muslim world, but rather patriarchal interpretations of the 
sunnah and Qur’an which have created a dominant, patriarchal narrative of what Islam 
says about the status of women. Female religious authority thus brings the unheard 
female interpretation into mainstream concepts of Islam. Zainah Anwar, a prominent 
Islamic feminist from Malaysia, describes the crucial role of female interpretations of 
Islam in the modern world: 
This decision of so many feminists and human rights activists to ignore religion 
has had detrimental consequences. It has left the field wide open for the most 
conservative and intolerant forces within Islam to define, dominate, and set the 
parameters of what Islam is and what it is not. They decide what a good Muslim 
is, they dictate how to be a good Muslim woman, wife and daughter, and then 
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prescribe laws and policies that keep women shackled as second-class Muslims, 
indeed, second-class citizens.156 
 
 Thus, at the most basic level, female religious scholars are able to contribute a 
female perspective to a previously male-dominated field. As Dr. Mekkaoui has stated, 
female scholars are more aware and concerned with women’s issues as they are more 
exposed to such issues than male scholars. Whether or not they have radical ideas for 
reform, female scholars are more aware of issues plaguing Moroccan women, and can 
thus bring these issues to the light. 
 As depicted by Mekkaoui and Bouselama, female scholars do bring female 
concerns to the forefront. Both Mekkaoui’s and Bouselama’s discussions of the current 
status of the modern family raise multiple issues that Mernissi stresses to improve the 
status of women in the family unit: the importance of love and compassion in marriage, 
rethinking what qiwamah entails, and the concept of justice. Relating back to Mernissi’s 
argument, emphasizing love between spouses directly opposes the limiting perception 
of sexuality that regulate the traditional idea of marriage. Rather than the relationship of 
husband and wife centering around bearing children and satisfying female sexual 
desires in order to prevent fitna, a marriage based on love does not rely on traditional 
concepts of sexuality. Both of these scholars also encourage the disintegration of 
traditional gender concepts based on separate roles for man and wife: by emphasizing 
the importance of sharing housework duties, and financial responsibility, Mekkaoui and 
Bouselama are both emphasizing justice instead of gender roles. As described by 
Eddouada and Pepicelli, “justice is a means to avoid the confusion of gender roles and 
                                                        
156 Anwar, 2013: 114-5 
 
 
47 
 
thus to recognize the value of the role of the woman as a wife and mother.”157 As such, 
emphasizing justice places great worth on the contributions of both husband and wife, 
rather than one above the other. By working within the context of Islam, and focusing 
on issues facing women, these scholars are thus creating an Islamic feminist narrative 
within some of the highest ranks of Islam in Morocco. This depicts the dedication of the 
‘alimat to liberating Moroccan women. 
These positive concepts of gender, however, appear to be only partially 
institutionalized. According to the Family Law, men must “provide for their family’s 
needs, while women can choose to contribute as their abilities allow.”158 While this may 
appear to give women a choice in pursuing economic means, it presents a dichotomy: 
men are still noted as the primary provider, thus reinforcing a traditional notion of 
masculinity as the economic provider. This statement, then, simultaneously adheres to 
the traditional concept of masculinity, while providing a more nuanced depiction of 
femininity. For the Moroccan youth excluded from the current economy, they are 
unable to achieve this economic depiction of their masculinity as conveyed by the state. 
Thus, although some of the findings of the ‘alimat do appear to be integrated into state 
rhetoric, prevailing family law currently preserves oppressive concepts of masculinity.  
Murshidat translate these concepts of a new form of femininity through their 
interactions with women. In discussions with young girls whose fathers are afraid to let 
them leave the house, Bouchra describes this as: “a misunderstanding in our society that 
girls are the cause of troubles and if a girl is away from home she will get herself into 
trouble.” She then concludes this interpretation by saying: “As women, we can do                                                         
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anything.” This effectively explains the traditional concept of femininity as something 
that unfortunately exists, but that women do not have to submit to.  
 Another way that positive concepts of femininity are integrated is through the 
murshidat program itself. Religious counseling is a crucial aspect of Islam, and the 
prominence of mystical healers and cults in Morocco depicts just one way that women 
have come to cope with the lack of formal religious counseling prior to the murshidat 
program. The popularity of spiritual possession cults and rituals “compensate for 
subordinate status and powerlessness” with the “body constitute[ing] the battlefield for 
disputes about power and functions according to the division and use of space.”159 This 
fits in with Mernissi’s narrative of the deep intertwining of power and sexuality 
plaguing both men and women. Where the murshidat program and these spiritual cults 
appear to differ is how empowerment is depicted. These spiritual cults emphasize the 
relationship of power with the body, which is appropriate in the traditional perception of 
gender roles and sexuality. Murshidat, however, steer away from the relationship of 
power and sex by emphasizing knowledge and education as a source of empowerment. 
 Through the murshidat’s emphasis on promoting education for girls and women 
of all ages, and the ‘alimat’s prominent positions of scholarly accomplishment, this 
reform is exposing the Moroccan woman to new forms of female literacy and scholarly 
success. Equipping women with knowledge, including knowledge of their rights, is 
crucial for female liberation. A young man from a rural village in the Larache region 
describes how this lack of education leads to exploitation: “women here work like this 
because they have no education. Without skills or qualifications, they are under men’s                                                         
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control. If a man makes a demand and his wife doesn’t obey he can divorce her, so she 
just has to work and carry on. Even though she’s the one working, he will still beat her 
often for one tiny thing.”160 Thus, female illiteracy enhances ignorance of rights, only 
serving to deter female liberation. Through encouraging a more in depth knowledge of 
the religious rights women hold, murshidat and ‘alimat are equipping women with a 
means to better grasp their rights and abilities. This is a very specified education, 
however, as religious rights are discussed, without mention of legal rights. 
Not only do murshidat stress the importance of learning and knowledge of 
religion in their interactions with people, it is precisely their education that gives them 
their respect and qualifications to assert their authority and status with men as well. 
Murshidat state that it is the combination of their bachelor’s degree and their religious 
education (imams are not required to have a bachelor’s degree) that allows them to 
assert their authority to their male colleagues and the general public, and be treated with 
respect in return.161 A male teenager in contact with Karima acknowledges her 
extensive knowledge of Islam and training as reasons why he trusted her.162 Here, 
again, the education and knowledge of the murshidat is noted as what gives them 
legitimacy. 
 This combination of a religious education coupled with a bachelor’s degree 
further exemplifies the role of women in positions of religious authority in bridging the 
religious sphere with the social sphere. As discussed in detail by Mernissi, the 
democratization of education desegregated Moroccan society: “Schooling has dissolved 
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traditional arrangements of space segregation […] simply because, to go to school, 
women have to cross the street! Streets are places of sin and temptation, because they 
are both public and sex-minded. And that is the definition of fitna, disorder!”163 While 
education and employment for women desegregated the social sphere, traditional 
concepts of masculinity and femininity continued, creating what she refers to as a 
“sexual anomie” as “the moral system which has prevailed for centuries is shaken, and 
fails to respond to new conditions of human life, without any new system having yet 
been formed to replace that which has disappeared.”164 Thus, women in these positions 
are not creating a drastic desegregation of society, as that has already occurred; they are 
creating a consistent narrative of what women are permitted to do throughout society, 
thus serving to heal the “anomie” that Mernissi discusses. 
 According to Morocco’s most recent report to CEDAW in 2006, Morocco has 
put forth a number of initiatives to combat the representation of gender in the country. 
In addition to projects aimed at removing sexism from education and media, the report 
outlines new guidelines and support for imams in emphasizing “human dignity and 
moderation”165 in sermons, the state religious trainings for ulama, murshid, murshidat, 
imams, Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs delegates and religious 
television and radio program hosts must all take part in. The state also notes revision of 
the Family Code in regards to the principle of equality of the sexes as “another initiative 
in the drive to change mentalities.”166 The inclusion of these programs in Article 5 of 
the report, titled “Modifying Social and Cultural Patterns,” thus acknowledges the                                                         
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impact of these sources in conceptualizing gender roles throughout the country. It also 
reveals an instance of ijtihad, in which the state revised the Family Law to conform to 
and reflect the modern reality of the country. 
While murshidat and ‘alimat may provide quality empowerment, there are a 
number of factors which deeply limit their reach. First, ‘alimat and murshidat are only 
implemented at a fraction of the rate of their male counterparts. The graduating class 
size of murshidat is only one third of the graduating class size of murshid, and that does 
not even take imams into account. Thus, while the services and perspectives provided 
by these women are evidently in high demand, there are simply not enough of these 
women to effectively reach all who would benefit from their services.  
Second, ‘alimat and murshidat exist to promote Moroccan Islam explicitly, not 
necessarily to address the concerns of women. These positions serve the King. Because 
they go through state training facilities and programs, tools developed by Hassan II to 
create a docile and allegiant ulama, these women are trained to promote a singular form 
of Islam. While ‘alimat are trained in a wide variety of disciplines and thus discussion 
styles, murshidat are trained to not question or partake in religious debate, as this would 
cause fitna. 167 Thus, these women promote a specific form of religion, dictated by the 
monarchy, which creates a limited scope of what can be discussed and how.  
Third, as is recounted by Bouchra, Hannane, and Karima over and over, there is 
only so much murshidat can do to intervene. The advice the murshidat give to young 
girls in difficult situations is to tell their family members what they want, and to stand 
up to their fathers or husbands. While I have no research to support that this tactic does                                                         
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or does not work, I see this as potentially dangerous for the women in these situations. 
More research would be necessary to investigate the effectiveness of this tactic. 
Reduced or Enhanced Oppression? 
When asking the question of whether or not modes of oppression are decreased, 
the answer will depend on two main items: is the discussion of traditional masculinity 
reduced in favor of a less rigid definition removed from the intertwining of economic 
and sexual success? Are patriarchal forms of governance being restructured to give 
women more ability to establish their own religious realities? 
While murshidat and ‘alimat are finding new ways to change the discussion of 
femininity away from oppressive concepts of dangerous sexuality, the same does not 
appear to exist for refining the discussion of masculinity. Although Bouselama’s work 
does note how masculinity is not lost by assisting in domestic tasks, this narrative of 
changing roles of the husband is not translated into the family code like the changing 
role of the wife is: men are still listed as the primary provider, while the woman has a 
choice.168 
The perception of the stark divide of gender roles is culturally entrenched. A 
young unemployed man from the rural Larache region explains: “What can we do? If I 
found work, my wife would not have to work but God knows we are poor. I wish I 
could keep my wife at home. What should I do, women’s work? It would be shameful 
to be seen doing housework. If the neighbors saw me sweeping the floor I’d be the 
laughing stock.”169 Without the resources to reconstruct concepts of what work is 
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socially acceptable for a man to partake in, this perception will continue to leave both 
men and women with narrow options in how they conceive of their roles within the 
family unit. Men also require new spaces developed for conversations about what 
masculinity and femininity entail, like those that the murshidat are able to construct for 
their female constituents. 
Considering the economic climate of growing youth non-involvement, this thus 
presents a strain on the traditional concept of the male as the economic provider. As 
Mernissi discusses, economic power and sexual power are intimately related, and for 
frustrated males in a depressed economy, “the psychological function of female 
oppression [works] as an outlet for male frustration and aggression.”170 She argues that 
in times of economic depression, as marriages occur later and married men are unable 
to economically provide for their families, men become more sexually frustrated. 
Starting from boyhood, males are taught they should “expect full satisfaction of their 
sexual desires,”171 and are not socialized to cope with not receiving immediate 
satisfaction. Rather than allowing open conversations about this frustration, mean are 
socialized to not speak about what is considered perversity, and “the family offers the 
sexually and politically oppressed Moroccan male a natural outlet for his 
frustrations.”172  
By maintaining rather than challenging these conceptions of manhood, the 
Moroccan state is using a religious revival to simultaneously enhance the importance of 
male purity and economic success, while reforming the way femininity is discussed. 
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Thus, this lack of support for males in Moroccan society is linked to a greater intensity 
of oppression against women. Female scholars and religious guides are limited to 
mostly interacting with women, and as such it is not in their capacity to have these 
discussions with men. 
In terms of the economic state of the country, entrenched patriarchal power also 
severely limits the ability of the government to be held accountable for economic 
decisions. According to the World Bank, the impediments to Morocco achieving job 
creation for youth include how “Morocco is still very centralized,”173 even after the 
2011 constitutional reform which promised a change. In addition, the educational 
system is not preparing students well for the work force. Public school classes are in 
Arabic, while most jobs require knowledge of French. As the World Bank attests: 
Given that reform in public education is going to take a long time, it is important 
to find other means to facilitate the school to work transition in the 
meantime.  The report looks at ways to provide opportunities outside the school 
system that would have a quick impact on skills and job placement. There are 
things that can be done without having to go through another degree, such as 
apprenticeships, and encouraging and investing in micro-entrepreneurship and 
self-employment.174     
 
Religious authority remains a narrative controlled entirely by the state rather 
than these individual women. In contrast to these reforms inspired and requested by the 
demands and proposals of civil society and the people, the religious reform which 
implements women into positions of religious authority appears to be proposed by the 
palace. During my research, I did not come across any demands or requests by 
Islamists, secular feminists, or other civil society organizations to incorporate women 
into these positions of religious authority. Rather, the efforts and concerns voiced by                                                         
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these groups center on items such as providing more protections for repudiated women, 
different rights to inheritance, the rights of Moroccan women abroad, and eliminating 
the marriage of minors once and for all.175 Thus, women do not appear to be 
championing for their inclusion in religious authority. This was rather a program 
initiated and carried out by the state, depicting an instance of patriarchal power. 
The differences in media coverage of the family law reform and the murshidat 
program further exemplify how the state prioritizes its own patriarchal power over 
women’s rights. The state funds a number of television stations that have immense 
influence in dispersing information throughout the country. These stations provided 
“extensive news coverage [of the murshidat program and] broadened public awareness 
of the state’s recently initiated strategy to expand women’s participation in the religious 
domain.”176 This program was highly publicized and visible, due to the funding and 
efforts of the state. 
In a different vein, the 2004 family law reform was a huge success for women’s 
organizations, secular and Islamist alike, who had worked with policy makers for two 
decades to ensure the concerns of women were accurately represented in the new 
law.177 In other words, another aspect of the progressivity of this reform was not only 
the contents, but that the contents came from women’s groups rather than the patriarchal 
figure of the state. Since the family law reform in 2004, however, the state has still not 
put forth the same informative effort as done with the murshidat program. One 
Moroccan woman recounted that the only way she learned what new rights she was 
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allotted by the reform was to purchase a physical copy of the family law from a 
bookstore.178 Over a decade after the reform, the state has not initiated any widespread 
educational efforts to inform women of their rights. Judges, spokespersons for civil 
society organizations, and journalists have all blamed each other for not doing enough 
to reduce the lack of knowledge of what the reform encompasses,179 but the state 
ultimately has the capacity to disperse knowledge of these changes with its television 
and radio stations. Why the state has chosen not to publicize female legal rights is 
unknown, but it is evident that the failure to do so depicts a prioritization of the role of 
the state as the ultimate patriarchal figure rather than women’s rights. 
Some of the additional tasks of the murshidat suggest that these women are 
intended to also play a role in Morocco’s foreign and domestic policy. It is a 
requirement for murshidat to report any suspicious behavior, making some women feel 
as if they were engaged in “spy work,” and thus fearful for their safety.180 This is a 
curious aspect of the role of murshidat because it is a blatant issuance of a political 
obligation in an otherwise seemingly religious position. This thus enforces that the 
women in these positions are employees of the state above all else, directly involved in 
the fight against terrorism. 
Additionally, murshidat are sent on visits by the palace to the United States and 
Europe. In terms of foreign policy, Morocco’s “top priority” is solidifying ties and 
pleasing the EU and United States to establish itself as a liberal ally in North Africa. 
Politically, Morocco has strategically situated itself in a “zone of political 
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liberalism.”181 Projecting this image to the West is critical for Morocco’s “sunshine 
offensive”182 to “convince Westerners that the country is freer and more modern than 
ever”183 with the intent of inviting more foreign aid. Sending murshidat to Western 
countries to spread the news of another way Morocco promotes human rights and 
modernity thus fits into this public relations campaign to project Morocco as a free and 
liberal state. This has worked, as the innovative role of the women peppers Western 
media outlets. Thus, it appears that murshidat play a political role as promoting 
Morocco as a liberal state outside of the country as well. 
‘Alimat and murshidat thus have a limited role in reducing sources of 
oppression. Bouchra acknowledges the limits of her role: “Even though I believe in my 
work, sometimes I feel I can’t do enough. In some situations there is little I can do to 
help. Girls are forced to work here because of poverty. They don’t have choices in life 
and get mistreated by their husbands. It’s a combination of ignorance and poverty. We 
can’t get rid of poverty but we can try to change how people think.”184 The issues 
plaguing Moroccan women, and standing in the way of female liberation, thus continue 
despite the efforts of these women. 
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VII. Conclusions 
Murshidat and ‘alimat are providing Moroccan women with new sources of 
religious knowledge in a way that is attainable, by conveying female perspectives and 
reducing the strict boundaries of the traditional concept of femininity. While this is 
offering women much needed empowerment and support, this same program further 
enhances the patriarchal power of the King without addressing the oppressive factors on 
Moroccan masculinity. Because these women are powerless in addressing sources of 
female oppression, the status of women in Morocco will not change with this program 
alone. Three main impediments to female liberation continue: the patriarchal power of 
the King, prevailing oppressive concepts of masculinity, and the lack of access to legal 
rights and protections. 
 Morocco’s commitment to women’s rights is intended to benefit the state in 
return. This becomes a way for the state to withhold and increase religious power. It 
additionally strengthens the state’s image politically as a liberal ally to the United States 
and Europe, which thus also benefits the state’s political agenda. This produces a 
dichotomy, as the state will support women’s rights only so far as strengthening its own 
political power and religious reach in the country. The goal, as with other patriarchal 
states, is to create loyal citizens committed to a strong central power. This position of 
the state as the ultimate authoritative figure is detrimental to women’s liberation 
because, in the words of Kandiyoti, “as long as the patriarchal social order is taken for 
granted, naturalized and not opened to question, citizenship must remain imperfect and 
democracy truncated.”185                                                          
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 Why the state has not promoted legal rights, but has written them into law, is 
another question. This could possibly be because the reform did not strengthen political 
power for the state in any way, thus making it a low priority. The 2004 reform appears 
to oppose patriarchal power in its construction as civil society organizations, rather than 
the King, instigated it. Perhaps this was also a way of seemingly enhancing women’s 
rights, and thus committing to the political image of liberalization while keeping power  
within the hands of the King, as it rests with him whether or not the law will be known 
amongst the majority of the population as he can easily influence media. 
 The lack of focus on legal rights is especially troubling. Despite a reformed 
family law providing a multitude of new rights that have been made available for over a 
decade, 90% of the marriages of minors that come before judges are permitted.186 
Additionally, economic empowerment amongst women is not increasing. In fact from 
1999 to 2012, female participation in the workforce decreased by 5%.187 Although 
access to religious guidance is beneficial for bettering the way women and girls 
perceive themselves and their role in the community, this empowerment does not 
appear to be leaving the religious sphere. Women still do not know which legal rights 
they possess, an issue the state in no way appears to be addressing, and economic 
empowerment amongst women is dwindling. These examples suggest that this religious 
reform is just a way to mask the injustices and inequities existing in Moroccan society, 
as legal and economic empowerment are not improving nor supported by the state. 
 Moroccan men cannot be left out of the equation for female reform. If the 
expectations and changes in how men think about their daughters and wives do not                                                         
186 OECD, 2014 
187 Achy, 2013 
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change, in addition to how they consider themselves, women will remain oppressed by 
male family members. For this reason, more research is necessary into the influence of 
the murshid program, and how imams discuss masculinity and femininity with their 
male constituents. From my own research, I found nothing regarding the murshid, or 
how they discuss gender roles. Bouselama’s discussion of masculinity is promising, as 
it raises the involvement of justice in marriages with how men conceptualize their roles. 
In order to truly see a change in the situation of women and men, this will be crucial to 
continue.  
Additionally, the state needs to revisit Section 1, Article 51 of the moudawana 
that states that men are the primary provider. Restrictive notions of what it means to be 
a man in Morocco prevail, and are only reinforced with this article. Morocco’s 2006 
CEDAW report states, “The integration of the principle of equality between men and 
women in the new reform of the Family Code is another initiative in the drive to change 
mentalities.”188 This statement reveals the interest and commitment by the state to 
reform through the means of ijtihad, a process that can also be applied in the instance of 
article 51. Bouselama’s research and discussion of these issues, namely the division the 
roles within the family, provides the Islamic science evidence to accurately and 
appropriately instill this change in the Family Law. There is much work to be done at 
all levels to make justice and conceptions of masculinity apart from economic 
performance a reality, and this reform would pave the way for a multitude of other 
efforts to follow. 
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 The nature of job creation for youth needs to improve as well. Even if the 
discussion of the male provider role were to change, the fact that the family unit is a 
crucial aspect of Islam and Moroccan society, starting families and having the economic 
ability to provide for them will remain critical. Thus, sufficient job creation for youth is 
necessary to provide them with some sort of sustainable income and economic ability. 
As it is currently, “young men are expected to contribute money at home, and to save 
enough to start their own family. With the severe lack of opportunities they are capable 
of neither, and this failure has resulted in them becoming alienated within their own 
families.”189 Following the suggestions of the World Bank, this could include state 
investment in self-employment or micro-entrepreneurship. 
 At the core of this discussion of economic empowerment, however, is the 
transfer of power by the King to the prime minister. If the prime minister is not 
responsible for economic decisions, parliament thus cannot hold him accountable. 
Although the King did promise to transfer powers to the prime minister in 2011 under a 
constitutional reform, more research is necessary to delve into how much of these 
reforms are actually in place, and how much power the King truly released. 
 It is also worthy to note that although these discussions are beginning, changing 
the way people view themselves and others is an incredibly difficult process. Providing 
a platform for these conversations to take place is a task in itself, but actually changing 
minds is a very slow and unpredictable process. Hannane understands the difficulty of 
this process, “Any new idea we try to introduce to change life for the better – it will 
take time. Our goal is to plant the seeds. We may not see the fruit ourselves, maybe it                                                         
189 La Cava, 2012 
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will be our children maybe the next generation of murshidat. They will see the results 
insha’Allah.”190 
Thus, while Morocco’s religious reform does offer new forms of empowerment 
for women in the form of reformed concepts of femininity in the modern world, 
improving the situation of women requires a much more multi-faceted approach 
including the decentralization of power, a focus on changing restrictive narratives of 
masculinity, and increasing empowerment in all sectors of society for both men and 
women. 
                                                        
190 “Casablanca Calling” 
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